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In 1966, David O'Brien stood on the steps of the South Boston 
Courthouse and burned his draft card to communicate his opposi-
tion to the draft and the Vietnam War. A central part of the gov-
ernment's argument against him in United States v. O'Brien 1 was 
that alternative means of communication were available for the ex-
pression of dissent.2 Although the Supreme Court did not address 
the question of alternatives, the decision attached minimal signifi-
cance to the medium. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion ad-
dressed the question, concluding that O'Brien "could have 
conveyed his message in many other ways than by burning his draft 
card."3 In the 1980s the Supreme Court made the existence of al-
ternative means of communication part of its analysis in content-
neutral symbolic speech cases.4 
In cases where the medium is the message, any inquiry into 
alternatives rests on the false perception that messages can be surgi-
cally separated from their media.s Alternative means of communi-
• Professor, Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, Uni-
versity of Georgia. Copyright© 1991, William E. Lee. 
I. 391 u.s. 367 (1968). 
2. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
3. 391 U.S. at 389 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
4. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (not-
ing the similarity between the O'Brien test for content neutral regulations and the time, place 
and manner test, and applying a hybrid test). For criticism of the hybrid O'Brien time, place 
and manner test in settings other than symbolic speech cases, see David S. Day, The Hybridi-
zation of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free Speech Clause, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 195 
(1987). 
5. The premise that laws affecting media do not affect messages is a fundamental as-
pect of the Court's time, place and manner doctrine. See generally William E. Lee, Lonely 
Pamphleteers, Little People and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner 
Regulations of Expression, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 757 (1986). Although a prohibition of a 
medium may be facially content-neutral, it could have a discriminatory impact on certain 
messages. See id. at 764-71. 
Some commentators have recently suggested a heightened role for assessment of the 
suitability of alternative means of communication. SeeR. George Wright, The Unnecessary 
Complexity of Free Speech Low and the Centro/ Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 
Pace L. Rev. 57 (1989); Note, Motivation Analysis in Light of Renton, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 344 
(1987). While some aspects of alternative media, such as cost, are readily compared, this 
article argues that symbolic media involve factors, such as ability to convey emotion, that 
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cation, such as words, often lack the communicative power of 
symbolic actions such as flag burning. Additionally, the theoretical 
availability of alternative media is of little value to those who lack 
the skill or resources to use those media. 
This article advocates that the Court disregard the existence of 
alternative channels of communication when assessing content-neu-
tral prohibitions of symbolic media. This change would require the 
Court to treat the prohibition of a symbolic medium as a serious 
restriction on communicative opportunities rather than as a slight 
burden. The argument here is not that all methods of symbolic 
communication are protected. Rather, the argument is that the 
Court should recognize the importance individuals attach to the se-
lection of a method of expression. First amendment doctrine 
should presume that individuals know best both what to communi-
cate and how to communicate it. 
To ask merely whether alternatives exist accomplishes nothing, 
because the answer will always be yes unless the government has 
banned all methods of communication. To ask whether the alterna-
tives are "adequate" opens an inquiry into the capacity of various 
media to convey emotion and other highly nuanced and elusive as-
pects of symbolic speech. The Court has addressed similar issues in 
the context of words: some of the Court's answers provide a useful 
perspective for symbolic speech cases, and some answers reveal the 
difficulty of even posing the question of alternatives. 
In Cohen v. California 6 the Court overturned a conviction for 
the use of a particular word to express opposition to the draft. Jus-
tice Harlan, writing for the Court, understood the communicative 
importance of certain words. He wrote, "(W]e cannot indulge the 
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also 
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. "7 
Even though other words could be used to convey what Justice 
Harlan called "cognitive content," a particular word may be unique 
make comparison of alternative media exceptionally difficult. In symbolic speech cases, in-
quiries into the suitability of alternative media will be highly arbitrary and most likely will 
depend largely on judgments about whether use of a particular form of expression should be 
protected. 
6. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
7. Id. at 26. Professor White believes that certain words "do not operate in ordinary 
speech as restatable concepts but as words with a life and force of their own. They cmnot be 
replaced with definitions ... for they constitute unique resources, of mixed fact and value, 
and their translation into other terms would destroy their nature." James Boyd White, When 
Words Lose Their Meaning II (U. Chi. Press, 1984). 
In other settings, Justice Harlan was quite comfortable with the examination of the 
availability of alternative media. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); NLRB v. Fruit cf Vegetable Packers cf Warehousemen, Local 
760, 377 U.S. 58, 93 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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in conveying "otherwise inexpressible emotions . . which, practi-
cally speaking, may often be the more important element of the 
overall message sought to be communicated."s The advantage of 
Justice Harlan's view is that it avoids the intractable assessment of 
the suitability of alternatives. Surely the judiciary is ill-equipped to 
inquire into both the cognitive and emotive nuances of words. By 
treating a communicator's selection of the form of expression and 
the message equally, Justice Harlan's approach places the issues in a 
speech protective framework. 
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 9 the Court upheld restrictions 
on indecent broadcast speech. Justice Stevens's majority opinion 
claimed that the regulation would affect "the form, rather than the 
content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts 
that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." 10 
Justice Stevens' approach will never protect speech because it al-
lows the Court to treat the burden on expression as slight. Also, it 
allows the Court to disregard the link between the medium and the 
message. Justice Brennan's dissent, though, reflected the perspec-
tive stated in Cohen. He believed that words cannot be readily sepa-
rated from ideas and that "[a] given word may have a unique 
capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an 
image."11 
The looseness of defining "adequate" alternatives is shown in 
8. 403 U.S. at 26. See also Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286 (1952) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) ("Emotions sway speakers and audiences alike."). Linguists distinguish be-
tween the symbolic and emotive use of words. Professors Ogden and Richards wrote: "The 
symbolic use of words is statement; the recording, the support, the organization and commu-
nication of references. The emotive use of words is a more simple matter, it is the use of 
words to express or excite feelings and attitudes." Charles Kay Ogden & Ivor Armstrong 
Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 149 (Harcourt, Brace, & Co., lOth ed. 1949). They ac-
knowledge that both functions are subtly interwoven. ld. at 150. 
9. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
10. /d. at 743 n.l8. The broadcast in Pacifica was George Carlin's "Seven Dirty 
Words" in which the comedian used indecent language to satirize contemporary attitudes 
about certain words. It is difficult to conceive how Carlin could have made his point without 
using the offensive words. Professor Quadres notes that Carlin's monologue is "one of the 
best examples of ... form and message, totally merged." Harold Quadres, The Applicability 
of Content-Based Time. Place. and Manner Regulations to Offensive Language: The Burger 
Decade, 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 995, 1037 (1981). 
II. 438 U.S. at 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Bren-
nan recently described boycotts as a special form of communication because of the ability to 
convey unique emotional messages. He wrote, 
The passive nonviolence of King and Gandhi are proof that the resolute acceptance 
of pain may communicate dedication and righteousness more eloquently than mere 
words ever could. A boycott, like a hunger stoke, conveys an emotional message 
that is absent in a letter-to-the-editor, a conversation with the mayor, or even a 
protest march. 
FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768, 789-90 (1990) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
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San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Com-
mittee,12 where the Court upheld a permanent injunction prohibit-
ing the petitioner from describing an athletic competition and 
related events as the "Gay Olympics." To the Court, the restric-
tions on "Olympic" merely affected a manner of communication 
and not a message.t3 The Ninth Circuit found that the SFAA had 
"satisfactory" alternative means of communication, although it did 
not present any analysis of the substitutes. 14 The Court merely 
noted that the SF AA held its athletic event under the name "Gay 
Games," evidently assuming that the substitute was adequate.1s 
But Judge Kozinski and Justice Brennan regarded the availability 
of alternatives as irrelevant. Judge Kozinski wrote in dissent: "To 
say that the SF AA could have named its event 'The Best and Most 
Accomplished Amateur Gay Athletes Competition' no more an-
swers the first amendment concerns here than to suggest that Paul 
Robert Cohen could have worn a jacket saying 'I Strongly Resent 
the Draft.' "16 Justice Brennan's dissent stated that translations 
never fully capture the sense of the original and that the first 
amendment protects more than the right to a mere translation.11 
SF AA and Pacifica should be viewed in context: the former is a 
commercial speech case and the latter involved broadcasting. The 
Court regards first amendment interests in both settings to be re-
duced. Both cases can easily be set aside as precedents for cases 
where the symbolic speech addresses political issues, a subject mat-
ter the Court regards as at the core of first amendment protection.1s 
Cohen, therefore, sets the appropriate framework for symbolic 
speech cases involving political speech. Cohen raises a provocative 
question for symbolic speech: if prohibition of a particular word 
12. 483 u.s. 522 (1987). 
13. Id. at 536. 
14. Int. Olympic Com. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 737, reb. den. 
789 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit stated, "Because SFAA bad satisfactory 
alternative means for expressing its opposition to the Olympics, it bas no First Amendment 
right to use 'Olympics' or the Olympic symbols to promote its games or products." ld. The 
mere assertion of the availability of alternatives is common in symbolic speech cases. See, 
e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. II II, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (message could have 
been conveyed in many ways other than burning the flag). 
15. 483 U.S. at 536. 
16. 789 F.2d at 1321 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). 
17. 483 U.S. at 569-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
18. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (there is practically univer-
sal agreement that a major purpose of the first amendment was to protect the free discussion 
of governmental atfairs). Of course, the first amendment's protection is not limited to polit-
ical speech. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (cases have never 
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical 
matters is not entitled to full first amendment protection). The point is that cases such as 
O'Brien raise considerations wholly apart from those in cases such as SFAA and Pacifica. 
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creates the risk of suppressing an idea, does not a prohibition of a 
particular symbolic behavior also create the risk of suppressing an 
idea? 
In symbolic speech cases where the Court finds that the gov-
ernment is regulating content, the availability of alternatives is 
either not discussed-and by implication considered to be insuffi-
cient to justify the restriction 19-or it is explicitly rejected as a justi-
fication of the law.2o Under either approach, the result is the same; 
the Court does not allow the possibility of alternative media to alter 
the presumed invalidity of content-based regulations. 
Texas v. Johnson 21 illustrates the Court's approach to the ques-
. tion of alternative media in the context of content-based restric-
tions. The state claimed that the ftag was a unique symbol and that 
the statute was necessary to prevent dilution of the flag's symbolic 
value,22 but also asserted that alternative means of communication 
remained open for political dissent.23 The respondent claimed that 
the statute selectively relegated to other media only those who ex-
press viewpoints in opposition to the state's view of the ftag.2• Jus-
tice Brennan noted that the Court's hostility to content regulation 
"is not dependent upon the particular mode in which one chooses to 
express an idea."2s Further, the availability of alternative means of 
communication was insufficient to justify the law.26 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the ftag as 
a unique symbol27 but nonetheless claimed that flag burning "con-
veyed nothing that could not have been conveyed and was not con-
veyed just as forcefully in a dozen different ways. "2s The Chief 
Justice's claim, like that of the state, contradicts itself because if the 
flag is unique, then by definition other forms of communication can-
not be as "forceful" as flag burning. Granted, Johnson was free to 
19. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(prohibition on armbands was designed to suppress views opposing American involvement in 
Vietnam). 
20. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974) (rejecting state court's 
claim that the inhibition on expression was minuscule because many alternative media could 
be used). 
21. 491 u.s. 397 (1989). 
22. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Brief for Petitioner at 20, 27). 
23. Id. at 40. 
24. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (Brief for Respondent at 13 n.l4). 
25. 491 U.S. at 416. To the majority, the case was similar to Schact v. United States, 
398 U.S. 58 (1970) where the Court invalidated a federal statute that permitted actors to wear 
military uniforms only if the portrayal did not discredit the armed forces. 
26. 491 U.S. at 416 n.ll. 
27. ld. at 422 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). President Bush, who favored a constitu-
tional amendment to protect the flag, continually emphasized the flag's uniqueness. See, e.g., 
26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 938 (June 12, 1990). 
28. 491 U.S. at 431. 
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use verbal slogans, but Chief Justice Rehnquist offered no standards 
or guidelines to explain how he concluded that such slogans con-
veyed Johnson's message-both the cognitive and the emo-
tional29-as forcefully as flag burning. Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
perception of flag burning as an "inarticulate grunt" that was "no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas"3o is more accurately seen 
as reflecting his belief that the flag should have special protection 
than as an assessment of the communicative forcefulness of flag 
burning. 
Both the United States and the appellees in United States v. 
Eichman 3t agreed that the flag was unique. The United States ar-
gued that the importance of preserving the flag's symbolism war-
ranted placing flag burning outside the protection of the first 
amendment. This would not harm freedom of expression because 
alternative means of expression, such as words, remained avail-
able.32 To the appellees, however, the flag's symbolic significance 
made the impropriety of restricting its use even more apparent.33 
Flag burning was regarded as an "indispensable" means of rejecting 
forced patriotism,34 and as a way of leaping across language barriers 
to indict the government internationally for its oppression.3s 
The Court rejected the government's invitation to reconsider 
flag burning as fully protected expression and consequently did not 
address the relevance of the availability of alternative means of ex-
pression. In dissent, however, Justice Stevens suggested that 
prohibitions on certain methods of communication were justified if 
( 1) supported by a interest unrelated to suppression of specific ideas; 
(2) the speaker could use other means to express those ideas; and (3) 
the speaker's interest in using a particular means of communication 
was less important than the interest supporting the prohibition.36 
The first point concerns facial viewpoint neutrality, a factor Justice 
Stevens finds highly significant.37 While the Flag Protection Act of 
29. In Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), he acknowledged the "deep emotional 
feelings" the flag arouses. ld. at 602 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
30. 491 U.S. at 431-32. 
31. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). 
32. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (Brief for the United States at 45). 
At oral argument the government claimed that robust, uninhibited debate was unimpeded. 
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (Transcript of Oral Argument at 48). 
33. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (Brief for Appellee Strong at 31-32). 
34. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (Joint Appendix at 53) (declaration of David Blalock). 
35. Id. at 47-48 (declaration of Shawn Eichman). 
36. 110 S. Ct. at 2410 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37. See e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 438 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that 
flag statute does not facially single out particular viewpoints); Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, 427 U.S. 50, 86 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (zoning ordinance is viewpoint neutral). 
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19893s did not single out viewpoints such as opposition to racial 
discrimination, it punished acts associated with disrespect for the 
ftag and one's view of the ftag is a viewpoint.39 The second and 
third inquiries are more relevant to the purpose of this article. The 
second inquiry accomplishes nothing: as noted above, unless all 
other forms of expression have been banned, there will always be 
alternatives. To ask whether the alternatives are adequate is not a 
satisfactory question either. Both the definition and identification 
of adequacy are value laden and question begging. Adequacy can 
be defined according to hidden or underlying principles. For exam-
ple, if one believes that the first amendment protects messages to a 
greater extent than it protects the choice of a medium, 40 another 
medium will be adequate even though the communicator must sac-
rifice some intensity or communicative impact. Even if one believes 
that the alternatives must not result in diminished communicative 
impact, 41 the comparison of the communicative impact of various 
forms of speech is a highly elusive task.42 Justice Stevens proposed 
no definition of adequacy, nor did he elaborate the factors to be 
studied when determining adequacy.43 
Justice Stevens admitted that critical inquiry was really the 
third point: a balance of the individual's interest in using the ftag 
against the importance of the symbol. This inquiry, however, is 
38. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777, codified at 18 
u.s.c. § 700 (1989). 
39. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 413 n.9. One of the reasons the Eichman appellees burned 
flags was to protest "forced patriotism." Joint Appendix at 53 (declaration of David 
Blalock). 
40. a. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (people do not have a constitu-
tional right to speak whenever and however and wherever they please); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (the rights of free speech and assembly do not mean that everyone with 
opinions to express may address a group at any public place and at any time). 
41. But see Irving R. Kaufmann, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment, 
45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 773 (1970) ("[a]ll media cannot convey all messages with equal 
force"). 
42. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA 
L. Rev. 964 (1978). Professor Baker is also critical of the absence of criteria for measuring 
the adequacy of different forms of expression. He adds, 
Judges (as arms of the state), particularly given that judges are drawn almost exclu-
sively from the dominant classes in society, will normally find that the dissidents 
have had adequate opportunity and that they have lost in the debate because their 
position is unpersuasive. In other words, state determination of adequacy will usu-
ally favor the status quo. 
ld. at 987. 
43. Justice Stevens acknowledged that some media may be less effective in drawing 
attention, 110 S. Ct. at 2411 (Stevens, J., dissenting), but this does not address all of the 
reasons why communicators select a particular medium. For a discussion of factors motivat-
ing selection of a form of symbolic speech, see Howard M. Friedman, Why Do You Speak 
That Way? Symbolic Speech Reconsidered, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 587 (1988). 
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heavily dependent upon one's view of the usefulness of alternatives. 
Consider the following statements: 
A) There are many alternatives to flag burning; thus when the 
individual interest succumbs to the government's interest, free 
speech is insignificantly burdened. 
B) Flag burning is a unique form of expression; thus when the 
individual interest succumbs to the government's interest, free 
speech is significantly burdened. 
By presuming there were many alternatives, Justice Stevens framed 
the issues in a manner that easily allowed vindication of the govern-
ment's interest. As noted earlier, his presumption about alterna-
tives is flawed: if the flag is unique, then by definition there is no 
alternative means of expressing the message of flag burning. Recog-
nizing the communicative importance of flag burning does not nec-
essarily require a result in favor of the individual. The Court could 
still find the governmental interest to be sufficiently important to 
justify the admittedly serious impact on free expression. But to do 
so, the fit between the law's means and end must withstand exacting 
scrutiny. 
In its O'Brien brief, the United States claimed that draft card 
burning was not an "essential" means for disseminating a viewpoint 
because an array of alternative modes of expressing opposition to 
the Vietnam war existed.44 At oral argument, the Solicitor General 
again claimed that adequate alternatives existed: "O'Brien was free, 
at all times, to express dissent by speech from the courthouse steps, 
or on the street corners, by letters to the editor, by pamphlet, by 
radio and television."4s The Court did not expressly address the 
question of the availability of alternatives, but Justice Harlan wrote 
in a concurring opinion that the case would be altogether different if 
there were no other way for O'Brien to convey his message.46 Jus-
44. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Brief for the United States at 8). See 
also United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1966) (law prohibiting destruction of 
draft cards does not prevent political dissent through other means of communication). 
45. Transcript of Oral Argument 10, in Phillip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, 65 
Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the United States Supreme Court 908, 917 (University 
Pub., 1975). 
46. 391 U.S. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring). Professor Tribe regards the initial bur-
den of proof of the inadequacy of alternatives as resting upon the speaker. Laurence H. 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 983 (Foundation, 2d ed. 1988). Professor Redish dis-
agrees with this, stating that an inquiry into adequate media should occur only after the state 
has established a compelling interest for its regulation. Martin H. Redish, The Content Dis-
tinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 149 n.209 (1981). After a com-
pelling interest is established, Redish would require that the speaker prove that alternative 
media are inadequate. ld. at 149. Redish does note, however, that the inquiry into alterna-
tive media poses first amendment difficulties: "why is it an appropriate task for ... the 
Supreme Court to decide for Mr. O'Brien what increases or decreases the intensity of his 
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tice Harlan's opinion lacked an explanation of how he concluded 
that the alternatives conveyed the same message as draft card 
burning. 
What if the O'Brien Court had evaluated the adequacy of alter-
native forms of expression? O'Brien told the jury that he burned his 
draft card because he considered the draft system "intrinsically im-
moral, wrong, a system that sustains death rather than life."47 If 
O'Brien had stood on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse and 
uttered those words, would they convey the intensity of his feelings 
about the draft in a manner that could be identified as "adequate" 
in comparison to the burning of his draft card? It is one thing to 
measure readily identifiable factors such as the expense of various 
media; it is quite another for a court to compare the cognitive and 
emotional impact of different media. Comparing a form of sym-
bolic speech with other communicative modes involves elusive ques-
tions of nuance and communicative impact that ultimately depend 
on question-begging assessments of the activity's first amendment 
status. 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence•s also illus-
trates the difficulty of defining and identifying adequate alternatives. 
CCNV was permitted to erect a symbolic tent city to protest the 
plight of the homeless, but participants were not allowed to sleep in 
the tents. In its application for a Park Service permit, CCNV ex-
plained that the demonstration would allow the homeless to "com-
municate their humanity, their need, and their plight to the 
government and to the public, in the only real way open to them."49 
At the Supreme Court, CCNV explained that many homeless lack 
the resources and skills necessary to communicate their ideas 
through verbal expression.so The United States claimed that by it-
self, sleep would communicate only that the people were sleepy. 
Because the public would not understand the protester's message 
without an explanation through other media, sleep barely added to 
that message.s1 Justice White found that the regulation prohibiting 
message? Is not this very inquiry an invasion of first amendment freedom?" Id. at 148-49 
(notes omitted). 
47. United States P. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Joint Appendix at 29). 
48. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
49. Clark P. Community for CreatiPe Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (Joint Appen-
dix at 14). 
SO. Brief for Respondents at 22. At oral argument counsel for respondents stated, "The 
First Amendment, were it confined solely to verbal activity, were it confined solely to the 
classic means of expression, would be a means of communication that was open to the com-
fortable and the highly educated." Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Clark v. Community 
for Creatipe Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
51. Brief for Petitioners at 13-14. A similar claim was made during oral argument of 
Eichman when the government claimed that flag burning left a major "message gap" that had 
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camping in certain parks left the symbolic city intact with signs and 
the presence of those willing to take part in a day-and-night vigil. 
Thus, the regulation could not be faulted on the ground that the 
plight of the homeless could not be communicated in ways other 
than sleep.s2 By merely pointing to alternatives, Justice White im-
plicitly found them to be adequate. 
Justice White perceived the primary purpose of sleep as 
"facilitative."s3 Justice Marshall in dissent characterized the pri-
mary purpose of sleep in symbolic terms. Sleeping portrayed the 
neglect from which the homeless suffer "with an articulateness even 
Dickens could not match."S4 Although Justice Marshall agreed 
with the majority that the appropriate test was one in which the 
adequacy of alternatives was measured, he did not reach this prong 
of the inquiry because he felt the government had failed to justify 
the restriction.ss But his perception of the symbolic importance of 
sleep affected the intensity of his scrutiny of the government's inter-
ests. In contrast, the majority discounted sleep's symbolic impor-
tance and was thus able to treat the ban like a mere restriction on 
the demonstration's physical attributes, such as its size. But a pro-
hibition of a medium raises different problems from regulations af-
fecting where, when, and how speakers may use that medium. 
Banning sleeping as a manner of expression is distinct from limiting 
the number of participants in a sleep-in because the latter preserves 
the communicator's autonomy in selecting the medium of 
expression. 56 
Symbolic speech is of critical importance to those "puny ano-
nymities"s7 who attract attention to their ideas through the most 
to be filled in with words. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 ( 1990) (Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 5-7). Some Justices disagreed with this assessment of flag burning. Id. at 
8. See also text accompanying note 35. 
52. 468 U.S. at 295. 
53. Id. at 296. The organizers of the demonstration had experience with previous dem-
onstrations involving the homeless and claimed that unless the homeless had a "survival-
related reason" for being in the park, they would not participate. Joint Appendix at 14. To 
the extent that the ban would limit the nature, extent, and duration of the demonstration, the 
Court believed that it would lessen the impact on the parks. 468 U.S. at 296. Justice Mar-
shall argued that the facilitative purpose of sleeping took nothing away from its status as 
symbolic expression. Id. at 310 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
54. 468 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting CCNVv. Watt, 703 F.2d 586,601 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Edwards, J., concurring)). 
55. Id. at 308-12. 
56. Lee, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 805 n.30l (cited in note 5). I have previously com-
mented on the ambiguity of the term "manner." Id. at 757 n.2. In the symbolic speech 
context, it is critical for the Court to distinguish between regulations affecting the physical 
attributes of a manner of expression and total prohibitions of that manner of expression. 
57. The phrase originates with Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 
629 ( 1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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powerful communicative resource available to them, their symbolic 
behavior. The Court should recognize that for some communica-
tors and messages, there is no other medium. Additionally, the 
Court should recognize that a prohibition of a symbolic medium 
may have a disproportionate impact on certain messages. 
When the Court understates the importance of a particular me-
dium, as occurred in O'Brien and Clark, cursory scrutiny of the law 
occurs.5s Consider the consequences of disregarding alternatives in 
symbolic speech cases. This would avoid the intractable problems 
posed by judicial definition of the "adequacy" of alternatives. More 
importantly, disregarding alternatives casts the burden on expres-
sion in a different light. To facilitate important first amendment 
values such as self-fulfillment and the participation of poorly-fi-
nanced citizens, the Court should acknowledge the importance of 
an individual's choice of how to communicate. The Court's sym-
bolic speech methodology should disregard the fact that alterna-
tives-which are always available in theory-exist. 
58. The Clark Court barely scrutinized whether the prohibition advanced the govern-
mental interest and rejected the view that less restrictive measures were available. 468 U.S. at 
299. Justice White concluded that camping would be contrary to the government's interest in 
maintaining the parks, yet this overlooks that the government allowed the demonstrators to 
erect tents and feign sleep and that there was no proof that actual sleep caused additional 
damage. On the issue of the narrowness of the prohibition, the Court was satisfied that the 
prohibition did not exceed its purpose (id. at 297), and stated that the judiciary is not en-
dowed with "competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that 
level of conservation is to be attained." ld. at 299. The O'Brien Court gave very generous 
treatment to the government's interests; commentators describe the governmental interests in 
O'Brien as insubstantial. See, e.g., Dean Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The 
Draft Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. I, 23. The draft card destruction law was 
seriously defective because a law prohibiting nonpossession, which could occur for noncom-
municative purposes, was not enforced while the law against destruction was enforced only 
against those who publicly burned their cards. 
